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TRANSFORMATION: TURNING SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING 





The Voting Rights Act of 19651 may be the most successful 
piece of federal civil rights legislation in the long history of federal 
civil rights legislation.  The law swept away barriers to the ballot box 
endured by racial minorities, not only in the Deep South, but also 
across the United States.  The law ended literacy tests, imposed fed-
eral registrars on parts of the country that have systematically denied 
registration to racial minorities, and banned racial discrimination in 
voting.  The law also rearranged the constitutional order regarding 
federal power over state elections.  That rearrangement remained in 
place until 2013 when the Supreme Court, in Shelby County v. Hold-
er,2 struck down as obsolete the triggering formulas that placed all or 
part of sixteen states under federal control for election law changes.3  
Yet, nearly all of the other provisions of the Voting Rights Act 
passed in 1965 were unaffected by the Shelby County decision and 
remain in full force and effect. 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s invalidation of federal 
oversight of elections in sixteen states using Section 5 of the Voting 
 
*
 J. Christian Adams is the founder of the Election Law Center, PLLC, in Alexandria, Vir-
ginia.  He formerly served in the Voting Section at the United States Department of Justice 
from 2005 through 2010.  He has litigated multiple Section 2 cases at the Justice Department 
and in private practice.  He has been involved in a wide range of election cases pertaining to 
election integrity statutes, the Voting Rights Act and other federal election laws.  He is a 
member of the South Carolina and Virginia bars and holds a J.D. from the University of 
South Carolina School of Law.  Noel Johnson, Joseph Vanderhulst and Christopher J. Gard-
ner provided essential research and writing for this article and deserve extraordinary credit 
and thanks for their invaluable assistance. 
1 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301-10508 (2014) (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973aa-6). 
2 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
3 Id. at 2631. 
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Rights Act, litigation has commenced against multiple state election 
integrity statutes utilizing Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Chal-
lenges have been brought against election integrity statutes by the 
Department of Justice and private plaintiffs in Wisconsin, Texas, and 
North Carolina.4  At issue in these cases were voter photo identifica-
tion laws, changes to early voting periods, same-day voter registra-
tion, and requirements that voters only vote in the precinct where 
they live.5  These challenges, however, did not use traditional theories 
of Section 2 liability.  Instead, they advanced theories of Section 2 li-
ability that were used to block state election law changes under Sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act.6  The legal theories utilized in these 
cases seek to import statistical tests for Section 2 liability, which 
were previously utilized under the Section 5 retrogression standard to 
block state election laws.  If the plaintiffs are ultimately successful, 
the constitutional balance between states and the federal government 
that the Supreme Court sought to restore in Shelby County will be 
undone, and every state will risk violating the Voting Rights Act if 
any change to an election law has any statistical impact on a racial 
minority group.  Instead, courts reviewing Section 2 cases should uti-
lize longstanding jurisprudence requiring much more than statistical 
disparities in analyzing election laws for compliance with the Voting 
Rights Act and ask whether an equal opportunity to participate and 
comply with the law exists. 
II. OVERVIEW OF SECTIONS 2 AND 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS 
ACT 
The core behavior that Section 2 sought to stop was denial of 
 
4 See McDuffee v. Miller, 327 S.W.3d 808, 822-23 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that 
voters were not residents of the district and their votes were invalid); League of Women 
Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 834 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013) 
(holding that the photo identification requirement was not constitutionally unreasonable); 
United States v. North Carolina, No. 13-CV-861, 2014 WL 494911, at *1 (M.D.N.C Feb. 6, 
2014) (alleging that the elimination of same-day voter registration and presenting a valid 
photo identification in order to vote violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). 
5 Early voting is when polls are opened before Election Day.  In some states they are open 
for weeks.  See J. Christian Adams, Eight Reasons for Halting Early Voting, WASH. TIMES 
(Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/5/adams-eight-reasons-for-
halting-early-voting/?page=all.  Same-day registration is when a voter may register to vote 
and cast a ballot simultaneously.  Early voting affects the ability to monitor and police the 
polls and imposes significant costs on campaigns to find and place poll observers.  Same-day 
registration has resulted in voter eligibility not being verified before their ballot is cast. 
6 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548-49 (1969). 
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the right to register to vote.7  Denial of this right was the chief tactic 
employed by states and local election registrars to undermine the 
franchise of minority voters.  Disputes pertaining to registration bar-
riers dominated voting rights litigation in the period surrounding the 
enactment of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.8  Section 2 
gave plaintiffs an equitable cause of action against racial discrimina-
tion in voting, allowing them to enjoin election practices and proce-
dures designed to discriminate on the basis of race.9 
But even successful injunctions against one particular barrier 
to registration could not prevent the emergence of a new and creative 
barrier to registration not contemplated by the original injunction.  
Registrars invented new barriers to deny registration, such as new 
tests invented by a county registrar.  “[B]lacks were given more diffi-
cult questions, such as ‘the number of bubbles in a soap bar, the news 
contained in a copy of the Peking Daily, the meaning of obscure pas-
sages in state constitutions, and the definition of terms such as habeas 
corpus.’ ”10  White registrants were not given the same test and, thus, 
the process of registration was not equally open to all.  The courts 
provided no help.11  Whenever a new test emerged, a plaintiff was 
 
7 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). 
8 See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965) (invalidating arbitrary registra-
tion denials); United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733, 740 (5th Cir. 1963) (stating it is error to 
deny injunction in registration denial); Reddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 930, 934-35 (5th Cir. 
1958) (cancelling registration creates question of fact under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 and 1983); 
United States v. Mississippi, 339 F.2d 679, 682-83 (5th Cir. 1964) (holding registration prac-
tices to be illegal under 42 U.S.C. § 1971); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 356 
(E.D. La. 1963), aff’d, 380 U.S. 145, 150 (1965) (holding facially race-neutral registration 
prerequisites invalidated); United States v. Clement, 358 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 1966) (invali-
dating barriers to registration); United States v. Mayton, 335 F.2d 153, 156-57 (5th Cir. 
1964) (finding otherwise facially insufficient registration instruments sufficient to secure 
registration); United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 1961) (stating an injunction 
is required against state criminal prosecution of those encouraging registration); United 
States v. Raines, 189 F. Supp. 121, 133 (M.D. Ga. 1960) (holding 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) “for-
bids any distinction in the voting process based on race or color”); United States v. Ass’n of 
Citizens Councils of Louisiana, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 908, 909 (W.D. La. 1961) (seeking rein-
statement of “registration” under 42 U.S.C. § 1971); United States v. McElveen, 180 F. 
Supp. 10, 13 (E.D. La. 1960) (holding discriminatory application of registration statute is 
unconstitutional even when statute is not facially discriminatory); United States v. Alabama, 
192 F. Supp. 677, 682-83 (M.D. Ala. 1961), aff’d, 304 F.2d 583, 593 (5th Cir. 1962), aff’d 
per curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962) (holding racially discriminatory effects in registration proce-
dures illegal). 
9 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). 
10 Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 297 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
11 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 937 (1995) (stating there was almost absolute ex-
clusion of the Negro voice in state and federal elections); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
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forced to begin anew and file a case challenging the new test, even if 
an old test was enjoined. 
To prevent these ever-changing barriers to the franchise, 
Congress enacted Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.12  Section 5 re-
quired targeted states to submit any election related change, no matter 
how small and insignificant, to the United States Attorney General 
for pre-approval.13  This froze the benchmark system in place and did 
not permit a new and inventive barrier to become effective until it 
was precleared under Section 5. 
A. Functioning of Section 5—Statistical Retrogression 
Standard 
Section 5 required jurisdictions covered by Section 414 to pre-
clear “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
practice, or procedure with respect to voting.”15  A jurisdiction may 
seek preclearance from the Attorney General or through a declaratory 
judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia.16  Under either process, the covered jurisdiction must demon-
strate that the change will not have “the effect of denying or abridg-
ing the right to vote on account of race or color . . . .”17  Section 5 
employs a retrogression standard.18  This means that if a submitting 
jurisdiction cannot prove the total absence of any negative statistical 
impact, any diminishment of electoral ability, an objection must fol-
low.19 
The amendments to Section 5, passed in 2006,20 tweaked the 
standards for triggering an objection to a change in state voting law.  
 
U.S. 301, 310-11(1966) (stating tests were specifically designed to prevent Negroes from 
voting). 
12 52 U.S.C. § 10304. 
13 Id. 
14 52 U.S.C. § 10303. 
15 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 See generally Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (Justice O’Connor joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy concluded that “Creation of [the] District . . . (only) 
was not justified by a compelling state interest in complying with VRA § 5, which seeks to 
prevent voting-procedure changes leading to a retrogression in the position of racial minori-
ties with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”). 
19 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a). 
20 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthoriza-
tion and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.109–246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006). 
4
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An objection blocks the law from taking effect.21  Under the 2006 
amendments, if the ability of minority voters to vote is diminished, an 
objection to the election procedure is justified.22  The amended Sec-
tion 5 states: 
Any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting 
that has the purpose of or will have the effect of di-
minishing the ability of any citizens of the United 
States on account of race or color, or in contravention 
of the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of 
this title, to elect their preferred candidates of choice 
denies or abridges the right to vote within the meaning 
of subsection (a) of this section.23 
In reviewing submissions under Section 5, the Department of Justice 
first looks at the status quo, or benchmark law, and then analyzes 
whether minority voters face any numeric or qualitative diminishment 
of electoral strength or rights under the proposed plan.24  “[T]he base-
line is the status quo that is proposed to be changed: If the change 
‘abridges the right to vote’ relative to the status quo, preclearance is 
denied . . . .”25  If any diminishment results from the proposed 
change, the proposed change is blocked.  Adding to the difficulty for 
submitting jurisdictions, Section 5 shifts the burden onto the submit-
ting jurisdiction to prove the absence of any diminishment.26  The 
Department of Justice has no obligation to demonstrate that dimin-
ishment exists before interposing an objection to a submission.  In-
stead, the submitting jurisdiction has the obligation to prove the ab-
sence of any diminishment, or retrogression.27  Any doubt or 
statistical uncertainty decides the question against the submitting ju-
risdiction.28  If submitting jurisdictions cannot establish through 
quantitative evidence that the proposed change had no negative ef-




23 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b). 
24 Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 329 (2000). 
25 Id. at 334. 
26 See id. 
27 Id. at 336. 
28 See id. at 332. 
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the proposed change will not be pre-cleared.29 
In practice, the 2006 amendments to Section 5 created a sta-
tistical hair-trigger.  If there was any statistically retrogressive effect, 
an objection followed.30  If a submitting authority could not prove 
that there was no statistically retrogressive effect, an objection fol-
lowed.31  The Justice Department even blocked submissions when 
nobody, neither the submitting authority nor the Department, knew 
with certainty whether the proposed change had any discriminatory 
effect, simply because the submitting authority could not prove the 
total absence of any discriminatory effect.32  Any statistical ambigui-
ty or uncertainty was enough to block a proposed change.  Ambiguity 
weighed against the submitting jurisdiction.33  Importantly, the De-
partment steadfastly attached little or no weight to any mitigating 
components of an electoral change.34 
South Carolina, for example, suffered an objection to a voter 
photo identification law.35  In the letter, the Department reveals that a 
statistical difference of 1.6% in ownership of photo identification be-
tween whites as compared to blacks was sufficient discriminatory ef-
fect to interpose an objection.36  While 91.6% of whites in South 
Carolina appeared to have photo identification, 90% of blacks ap-
peared to possess it.37  Under the 2006 amendments to Section 5, this 
difference prompted the Justice Department’s objection because it 
“diminished” the electoral power of minorities, even if only by a sta-
tistically miniscule margin.  Little or no weight was attached by the 
Justice Department to the fact that the South Carolina law had a “rea-
sonable impediment” provision.  That is, if a voter affirmed that they 
 
29 Reno, 528 U.S. at 336. 
30 See 52 U.S.C. § 10304. 
31 See id. 
32 See Objection Letter of Loretta King, Assistant Attorney General, to Thurbert E. Baker, 
Attorney General of Georgia (May 29, 2009), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/crt/records/vot/obj_letters/letters/GA/l_090529.pdf.  This objection against Georgia’s 
efforts to verify the citizenship of voters was later withdrawn after Georgia sued the Attor-
ney General and challenged the constitutionality of the statistical hair trigger application of 
Section 5.  The Department of Justice withdrew the objection after Georgia agreed to ex-
traordinarily minimal alterations to the citizenship verification plan as part of a settlement. 
33 McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 257 (1984). 
34 See LaRoque v. Holder, 650 F.3d 777, 794 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
35 See Objection Letter of Thomas Perez, Assistant Attorney General, to C. Havird Jones, 
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could not obtain photo identification because of a reasonable imped-
iment, they were still allowed to cast a ballot and vote.38  This miti-
gating mechanism, while disregarded by the Department of Justice, 
was not disregarded by the federal court.  Indeed, the reasonable im-
pediment affidavit became the basis for preclearance after South Car-
olina sued the Attorney General in the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia seeking court-approved preclearance.39  
Preclearance was granted and South Carolina’s voter photo identifi-
cation law went into effect despite the Attorney General’s very public 
opposition to the provision. 
The 2006 amendments to Section 5 created a circumstance 
where the Department of Justice used the smallest statistical disparity 
to exercise federal power to block state election integrity laws.  Ironi-
cally, Republican sponsors of the 2006 amendments supported the 
amendments because they perceived them as favorable to their parti-
san interests when it came to redistricting.  They did not foresee, it 
seems, how Section 5 would be converted into a weapon to be used 
against state election integrity measures such as voter photo identifi-
cation, citizenship verification, or efforts to clean voter rolls of ineli-
gible voters.  When the Department of Justice lost the ability to flex 
this power against states after Shelby County, the Department em-
barked on a calculated campaign that borrowed the same de minimis 
statistical thresholds in Section 5, but used them in an unprecedented 
way in enforcing another part of the Voting Rights Act: Section 2. 
 
38 South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32 (D.D.C. 2012). 
39 The court took note of the Justice Department’s intransigence: 
Yet the Department of Justice and the intervenors have oddly resisted 
that expansive interpretation of Act R54.  They have insisted that the 
broad interpretation of the reasonable impediment provision advanced by 
the South Carolina Attorney General and State Election Commission 
contravenes the statutory language.  But interpreting the law as the re-
sponsible South Carolina officials have done—to allow the voter’s sub-
jective interpretation of reasonable impediment to control—is perfectly 
consistent with the text of Act R54. 
Id. at 37.  A submitting jurisdiction always has the option of bypassing the Justice Depart-
ment and submitting changes directly to the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.  Any jurisdiction seeking a transparent review free from the biases which have 
infected administration of Section 5 at the Justice Department should likewise bypass the 
Justice Department and go straight to federal court for preclearance. 
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B. Functioning of Section 2—Totality of the 
Circumstances Standard 
Section 2 is a nationwide ban on racial discrimination in vot-
ing.  It forbids any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a 
denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to 
vote on account of race or color.”40  The statute plainly bans denial of 
the right to vote “on account” of race.41  It also bans election laws 
that were enacted with a racially discriminatory intent.42  But after 
amendments to the statute in 1982, it also prohibits election laws, 
which have racially discriminatory results, subject to a broad non-
statistical inquiry.43 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act states: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or 
applied by any State or political subdivision in a man-
ner which results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on ac-
count of race or color, or in contravention of the guar-
antees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) [foreign lan-
guage minorities] of this title, as provided in 
subsection (b) [of this section]. 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) [of this section] is es-
tablished if, based on the totality of circumstances, it 
is shown that the political processes leading to nomi-
nation or election in the State or political subdivision 
are not equally open to participation by members of a 
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) [of this 
section] in that its members have less opportunity than 
other members of the electorate to participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice.  The extent to which members of a protected 
class have been elected to office in the State or politi-
cal subdivision is one circumstance which may be 
considered: Provided, That nothing in this section es-
 
40 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). 
41 See id. 
42 See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
43 S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 117, 206-07 
[hereinafter Senate Report]. 
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tablishes a right to have members of a protected class 
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the 
population.
 44 
1. Intent Prong 
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided City of Mobile v. Bol-
den.45  A plurality of the Court held that the original version of Sec-
tion 2 passed in 1965 only banned election practices or procedures 
which were enacted with a racially discriminatory intent.46  The Court 
ruled that Section 2 did not reach election laws, which might have a 
discriminatory outcome or result, but were not enacted with a racially 
discriminatory intent.47  As a result of this case, an effort commenced 
in Congress to expand the reach of Section 2.48 
2. Results Prong 
Adopted in 1982, the “results” language in part (b) of Section 
2 was a response to City of Mobile.49  The 1982 amendments to Sec-
tion 2 created a cause of action when a particular electoral practice 
was not necessarily enacted with a racially discriminatory intent, but 
had the result or effect of discriminating on the basis of race.50 
In Thornburg v. Gingles,51 the most important case decided by 
the Supreme Court after the 1982 amendments were adopted, the 
Court noted that the intent test in City of Mobile was “repudiated” by 
Congress and replaced with a new federal civil rights cause of ac-
tion.52  Though Gingles involved a challenge to a legislative redis-
tricting plan, the case has provided the central guidance for courts 
addressing Section 2 challenges.53 
The Gingles plaintiffs—a group of black, registered voters—
 
44 52 U.S.C. § 10301. 
45 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
46 Id. at 101 (White, J., dissenting). 
47 Id. at 62, 70. 
48 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982). 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
52 Id. at 44. 
53 See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1993); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 
U.S. 997, 1011-13 (1994). 
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challenged a legislative redistricting plan enacted by the North Caro-
lina General Assembly.54  Plaintiffs alleged that “the legislative deci-
sion to employ multimember, rather than single-member, districts in 
the contested jurisdictions” violated Section 2 because it “dilute[d] 
their votes by submerging them in a white majority, thus impairing 
their ability to elect representatives of their choice.”55 
In Gingles, the plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim was what is com-
monly referred to as a “vote dilution” claim.  As explained by the 
Gingles Court, “[t]he theoretical basis for this type of impairment is 
that where minority and majority voters consistently prefer different 
candidates, the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority, will 
regularly defeat the choices of minority voters,” and thus the exist-
ence of racial polarization in voting becomes an essential element to 
a Section 2 claim.56  Without racial polarization, a practice or proce-
dure that has a discriminatory result cannot impair the ability to elect 
candidates of choice or otherwise effectuate the political will of racial 
minorities. 
The Gingles Court laid out three necessary preconditions for a 
plaintiff to proceed with a claim that Section 2 has been violated: 
  
 Precondition #1: 
[T]he minority group must be able to demonstrate that 
it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to 
constitute a majority in a single-member district.  If it 
is not, as would be the case in a substantially integrat-
ed district, the multi-member form of the district can-
not be responsible for minority voters’ inability to 
elect its candidates.57 
 Precondition #2: 
“[T]he minority group must be able to show that it is 
politically cohesive.  If the minority group is not polit-
ically cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection of a 
multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive 
minority group interests.”58 
 
54 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35. 
55 Id. at 46. 
56 Id. at 48. 
57 Id. at 50. 
58 Id. at 51. 
10
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 Precondition #3: 
“[T]he minority must be able to demonstrate that the 
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable 
it—in the absence of special circumstances, such as 
the minority candidate running unopposed—usually to 
defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”59 
Notice that the second and third preconditions, commonly referred to 
as “Gingles Two” and “Gingles Three,” impose an element of causal-
ity, or outcome, on a Section 2 claim.60  Under Gingles Two, a claim 
may not proceed without the existence of racially polarized voting.61  
Under Gingles Three, a claim may not proceed unless the practice or 
procedure can be shown to have a real-world electoral impact that ul-
timately denies to minorities the equal opportunity to effectively par-
ticipate and elect candidates of choice.62 
After establishing the three preconditions, the Court also 
adopted the use of additional factors to consider in order to meet the 
“totality of the circumstances” test before a violation of the “results” 
standard of Section 2 can be found in the redistricting context.63  
Taken from the Senate Judiciary Committee’s majority report on the 
1982 amendment, the non-exclusive list factors to consider when 
evaluating whether Section 2 has been violated is as follows: 
1.  The extent of any history of official discrimination in the 
jurisdiction that touched the right of minorities to register, 
vote, or otherwise participate in the electoral process; 
2.  The extent to which voting in elections is racially polar-
ized; 
3.  The extent to which the jurisdiction has used unusually 
large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-
single shot provisions, or other voting practices that may 
enhance the opportunity for discrimination; 
4.  Whether minority candidates have been denied access to 
any candidate slating process; 
5.  The extent to which minorities in the jurisdiction bear the 
effects of discrimination in education, employment, and 
 
59 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. 
60 See id. at 51. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 Id. at 36-38. 
11
Adams: The Voting Rights Act
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
308 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
health that hinder their ability to participate effectively in 
the political process; 
6.  “Whether political campaigns have been characterized by 
overt or subtle racial appeals;” 
7.  The extent to which minorities have been elected to public 
office.64 
Under Gingles, to prove a violation of Section 2, a plaintiff 
must do more than show a statistical difference between how an elec-
tion law impacts minority voters.  Instead, a plaintiff must show that 
any statistical difference in the law’s result impairs the ability of mi-
nority voters to participate effectively in the political process.65  If, 
based on the totality of the circumstances, a plaintiff can show that 
the statistical differences were generated by one or more of the Sen-
ate factors or other indicia of discrimination that result in unequal ac-
cess to the political process, then Section 2 is violated.  Notice that 
Gingles placed multiple non-statistical hurdles in front of a plaintiff 
bringing a results claim.66  A plaintiff must show some causality, 
where a particular election law has the demonstrable impact of alter-
ing election outcomes.67  A plaintiff must also move beyond numbers 
and prove that the totality of the circumstances support liability using 
a multi-element Senate Factor test.68  If Section 2 were applied to 
cases where a statistical disparity drove a liability finding, absent 
causality and supported by a broad non-quantitative package of evi-
dence, then that version of Section 2 may well face serious constitu-
tional challenges, especially after Shelby County. 
C. Shelby County: The Supreme Court Strikes Down 
Triggers for Section 5 Enforcement 
In Shelby County, the Supreme Court struck down as uncon-
stitutional the triggers contained in Section 4 of the Voting Rights 
Act that determined which states were subject to Section 5 preclear-
ance obligations.69  Plaintiffs successfully challenged the triggering 
formulas, which were based on decades-old turnout data from the 
 
64 Senate Report, supra note 45, at 28-29. 
65 Id. at 16. 
66 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-46, 50-51. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. at 45. 
69 Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
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1964, 1968, and 1972 presidential elections;70 “[i]f Congress had 
started from scratch in 2006, it plainly could not have enacted the 
present coverage formula.  It would have been irrational for Congress 
to distinguish between States in such a fundamental way based on 40-
year-old data, when today’s statistics tell an entirely different sto-
ry.”71  The Supreme Court effectively shut down Section 5 enforce-
ment by finding that the triggers were an outdated intrusion into state 
sovereignty to run their own elections.72 
States must beseech the Federal Government for per-
mission to implement laws that they would otherwise 
have the right to enact and execute on their own . . . .  
And despite the tradition of equal sovereignty, the Act 
applies to only nine States (and several additional 
counties).  While one State waits months or years and 
expends funds to implement a validly enacted law, its 
neighbor can typically put the same law into effect 
immediately, through the normal legislative process.73 
In striking down Section 5’s coverage formula, the Court noted that 
the statistical standards of review within Section 5 also place a heavy 
burden on states.74  This significant observation by the Supreme 
Court should not go unnoticed, particularly when courts are tempted 
to borrow aspects of a Section 5 review when considering Section 2 
liability.  In 2006, 
Congress expanded § 5 to prohibit any voting law 
‘that has the purpose of or will have the effect of di-
minishing the ability of any citizens of the United 
 
70 Id. at 2619-20. 
71 Id. at 2630-31. 
72 Id. at 2624. 
73 Id. at 2624.  The Court could have gone further when it referred to “funds.”  South Car-
olina was forced to spend well over $3,000,000 in fees and costs to obtain judicial preclear-
ance of its photo voter identification law.  Adam Beam, S.C. Seeking to Recoup $53,000 
from $3.5 Million Cost of Voter ID Lawsuit, THE STATE (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www. 
thestate.com/2013/01/15/2591300/sc-seeking-to-recoup-53000from.html#storylink=cpy.  
The millions of dollars South Carolina spent to gain approval should lay to rest any argu-
ment that states “can just go to court to get preclearance if the Justice Department objects,” a 
common refrain voiced by both Republicans and Democrats during the 2006 reauthorization 
debates.  See Voting Rights Act: Section 5 Preclearance Standards: Hearing Before the Sub-
committee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 
109th Cong. 62-63 (2005) (exchange between Vice President (now President) and General 
Counsel for the Center of Equal Opportunity, Roger B. Clegg, and Congressman Mel Watt). 
74 Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
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States,’ on account of race, color, or language minori-
ty status, ‘to elect their preferred candidates of 
choice.’  In light of those two amendments, the bar 
that covered jurisdictions must clear has been raised 
even as the conditions justifying that requirement have 
dramatically improved.75 
Should Congress ever craft new and constitutional triggers for Sec-
tion 4, the hair-trigger statistical elections of Section 5, whereby any 
diminishment of electoral clout results in an objection, may them-
selves face a constitutional challenge.  As we shall see, just because 
the Supreme Court shut down Section 5 enforcement in Shelby Coun-
ty that does not mean that the Justice Department went along entirely.  
In the meantime, courts applying Section 2 should take note of the 
Supreme Court frowning on the idea that statistical diminishment jus-
tifies federal intrusion into a state’s power over state elections. 
III. USING SECTION 5 TO TRANSFORM SECTION 2 
Understanding some of the vested factional interests associat-
ed with Section 5 enforcement over the decades facilitates a full un-
derstanding of the willingness of plaintiffs and the Justice Depart-
ment to press novel Section 2 theories to reacquire a measure of 
power over state elections lost after Shelby County.  Section 5 was 
the chief mechanism for a wide variety of interests to assert power 
over elections in the United States.  More than half of the United 
States population in 2010 lived in states subject to Section 5 preclear-
ance of election law changes.76  Interests ranging from the political 
parties, incumbent administrations, racial interest groups, civil rights 
organizations, and even individual politicians, have used the Section 
5 process to extract political advantage through a mechanism estab-
lished to protect civil rights.77  This was easy to do for multiple rea-
 
75 Id. at 2627 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
76 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the population of states covered by Section 5 
oversight in 2010 was 163,825,396.  The total population of the United States was 
308,745,538.  Thus 53% of Americans lived in a state where the federal government exer-
cised Section 5 oversight authority over every state election law change.  United States Cen-
sus 2010, CENSUS.GOV, http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-pop-text.php 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
77 See Hans A. von Spakovsky, The Bailout Bait and Switch: DOJ’s Last-Ditch Attempt to 
Rescue Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 18, 2011), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/04/the-bailout-bait-and-switch-dojs-last-
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sons.  First, the Section 5 process largely occurs behind closed doors 
and free from public scrutiny.  Files on individual submissions at the 
Justice Department have both a “public” and “non-public” portion in 
each file.  Thus, the Department jealously guarded against the release 
of any information which revealed the internal analysis behind an ob-
jection or preclearance, the identity of individuals advocating for an 
objection or preclearance, and the substance of such advocacy.78  In-
deed, abuse of this secretive process had led to withering criticism 
from federal courts aimed at the Justice Department Voting Section’s 
abuse of power under Section 5 for engaging in improper and unethi-
cal conduct—so much so that the Section has been severely sanc-
tioned.79 
Notably, Voting Section lawyers were sanctioned $1,147,228 
in Hays v. State of Louisiana.80  In that case, a federal court imposed 
sanctions after finding that “the Justice Department impermissibly 
encouraged—nay, mandated—racial gerrymandering.”81  The court 
noted that, in drawing the redistricting plans, the Louisiana 
“[l]egislature succumbed to the illegitimate preclearance demands” of 
the Voting Section in the Section 5 process.82  The Voting Section us-
ing the Section 5 process illegally forced Louisiana to draw election 




78 This secrecy did not stop voter photo identification opponents working inside the Jus-
tice Department from leaking to the Washington Post the internal Section 5 memorandum 
regarding preclearance of Georgia’s photo identification law in 2005.  Dan Eggen, Criticism 
of Voting Law Was Overruled, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/16/AR2005111602504.html.  The newspaper published 
the full content of the internal legal analysis as a PDF. 
79 See von Spakovsky, supra note 77.  The Justice Department’s Civil Rights division, for 
example: 
[W]as ordered to pay $587,000 in sanctions in a redistricting case (Miller 
v. Johnson) in which both the Supreme Court and a federal district court 
characterized the Division’s underhanded litigation tactics as ‘disturb-
ing.’  In fact, the district court in the Miller case went much further, say-
ing that the ‘considerable influence of ACLU advocacy on the voting 
rights decisions of the United States Attorney General is an embarrass-
ment.’  The court added that it was ‘surprising that the Department of 
Justice was so blind to this impropriety, especially in a role as sensitive 
as that of preserving the fundamental right to vote.’ 
    Id. 
80 936 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1996). 
81 Id. at 369. 
82 Id. at 372. 
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The scolding in Johnson v. Miller83 was even worse.  In that 
case, the Voting Section sought to impose an illegal, racially gerry-
mandered legislative redistricting plan on the state of Georgia.84  In 
attempting to create as many black-controlled legislative districts as 
possible, Voting Section lawyers became impermissible advocates for 
interest groups.85  The court found that interest groups were “in con-
stant contact with . . . the DOJ line attorneys . . . .”86  Finding this co-
ordination “disturbing,” the court declared, “[i]t is obvious from a re-
view of the materials that [the ACLU attorneys’] relationship with the 
DOJ Voting Section was informal and familiar; the dynamics were 
that of peers working together, not of an advocate submitting pro-
posals to higher authorities.”87  The court concluded, “the considera-
ble influence of ACLU advocacy on the voting rights decisions of the 
United States Attorney General is an embarrassment. . . .  It is sur-
prising that the Department of Justice was so blind to this impropriety 
. . . .”88  Section 5 provided a wide range of groups, politicians, indi-
viduals and bureaucrats the opportunity to exert extraordinary power 
over American elections, and over time, these interests became ac-
customed to wielding such power over states and local jurisdictions.89  
When Section 5 was effectively lost in Shelby County, these interests 
sought out new ways and mechanisms for reacquiring the power over 
state elections which the Supreme Court had snatched from them.  
Thus, the theories of litigation discussed in this article emerged in 
part because of the loss of this power to these interests. 
In the intervening years since Section 5 became law, politics 
and race began to become synonymous.  Patterns of racial polariza-
tion began to align with patterns of partisan preferences.  Cohesion 
levels among black voters increased, and this racial block voting had 
a counterpart—high degrees of partisan cohesion.  Democrats be-
came the beneficiary of extraordinary levels of racial block voting.90  
 
83 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994). 
84 Id. at 1360-61. 
85 Id. at 1362. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Miller, 864 F. Supp. at 1368.  The Supreme Court eventually affirmed the lower court 
in this case.  Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
89 See generally von Spakovsky, supra note 77.  In multiple instances, the support or si-
lence of one particular black state legislator was enough to justify preclearance and dispense 
with any serious statistical or qualitative internal review of a submission. 
90 This raises serious questions about the future of Voting Rights Act enforcement.  What 
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The relevance of this trend to the Voting Rights Act is obvious.  The 
use of federal power, whether through Section 2 or Section 5, to en-
hance minority voting clout will necessarily enhance Democratic Par-
ty clout.  If racial polarization levels remain high among racial minor-
ities while whites are less polarized, one party may benefit.  This 
circumstance further illustrates why various interests and factions 
were desperate to seek out a new means to preserve as many elements 
of the pre-Shelby County mechanisms of federal power as possible.  
One such mechanism was using the Voting Rights Act to block elec-
tion laws, which have any statistical impact, no matter how small, on 
the ability to elect the minority candidates of choice, who are almost 
always Democrats.  This history of enforcement of Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act at the Justice Department provides critical context 
to the zeal in which advocates have sought to transform Section 2 in-
to something resembling Section 5. 
A. Justice Department Post-Shelby County Working 
Group 
Even before Shelby County and Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District Number One v. Holder91 were decided, defenders of 
the Section 5 preclearance scheme were realistic.  They understood 
there was as strong likelihood that the triggers to Section 5 coverage 
would be struck down.  Soon after the inauguration in 2009, a secre-
tive working group was established inside the Justice Department to 
develop a response to the loss of Section 5 preclearance powers.  If 
for no other reason, the Department had to consider what to do with 
the dozens of employees who would be idled if the Supreme Court 
struck down the power to review state election law changes.  In fact, 
staff dedicated to the Section 5 review process constituted more than 
half of the employees in the Voting Section, so a response had to be 
 
should happen if racial cohesion rates reach such levels such that voters of one race cast 
nearly all of their ballots for one party?  Should federal law remain unchanged if partisan 
interests merge with racial voting patterns?  Or, as some have suggested, should Democrats 
throw caution out and use the Voting Rights Act in a nakedly partisan way to bolster the 
electoral goals of the Democrat party?  Some advocates are not so secret in their desire to see 
civil rights laws morph into Democrat get-out-the-vote aids.  See Ellen D. Katz, Democrats 
at DOJ: Why Partisan Use of the Voting Rights Act Might Not Be So Bad After All, 23 STAN. 
L. & POL'Y REV. 415 (2012).  My view is such a nakedly partisan use of the Voting Rights 
Act will erode support for the law and result in even more racial polarization. 
91 557 U.S. 193 (2009).  This case was an earlier challenge to Section 5 triggers.  The 
Court declined to reach the constitutional issues. 
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formulated.92  As a result, this secretive working group developed an 
action plan to employ if Section 5 review powers were lost.  But not 
everyone was included in the group.  Individuals in management who 
would have opposed transforming Section 2 into a statute resembling 
Section 5 were not included in the working group.  Individuals who 
would disagree with using minimal statistical differences in the im-
pact of election laws to support a Section 2 claim were not included.  
Christopher Coates was the Chief of the Voting Section while this 
working group was functioning. 
During the time I was Chief of the Voting Section, the 
administration excluded me from meetings in which 
there were discussions of what actions the Voting Sec-
tion would take if the Court struck down Section 5 re-
view powers.  I feel certain that the use of Section 2 
litigation as a substitute for Section 5’s absence was 
one of the subjects discussed at these meetings.  Alt-
hough I have always been a strong supporter of filing 
Section 2 litigation to remedy discrimination against 
racial minorities, I would not have countenanced at-
tempting to nullify a Court ruling by substituting Sec-
tion 2 litigation for Section 5’s non-retrogression 
standard.  And I feel certain that my view on that sub-
ject was at least one of the reasons that I was purpose-
fully excluded from those meetings.93 
Instructions were given that Section Chief Coates should not 
even be informed about the existence of the group.  One member of 
the secretive working group, however, informed Coates of its exist-
ence.  Just fifty-eight days after the Supreme Court decided Shelby 
County, the Justice Department filed a complaint challenging a voter 
photo identification law in Texas as a violation of Section 2 because 
 
92 It is hard to imagine a government initiative providing a better example of James Bu-
chanan’s Nobel winning Public Choice Theory.  See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON 
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY (1962), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv3.html.  
In fact, no reduction in force was undertaken at the Voting Section even after Shelby idled 
more than half the staff. 
93 Author’s conversation with Christopher Coates, former U.S. Justice Department Voting 
Section Chief (Jan. 15, 2015).  The Voting Section Chief both administers the staff of the 
Voting Section as well as all litigation and administrative reviews.  The Chief is the most 
important and logical person to include in any meeting affecting the Voting Section and the 
enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. 
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of statistical disparities.94 
B. Section 2 Challenges in Texas and Wisconsin 
Challenges to election integrity statutes in Texas and Wiscon-
sin revealed a new use of Section 2 to attack election process laws 
designed to promote election integrity.  Both courts found that voter 
photo identification laws in those respective states violated Section 
2.95 
1. Texas 
In 2011, Texas enacted Senate Bill 14 (“SB 14”).96  Begin-
ning on January 1, 2012, SB 14 required voters to present photo iden-
tification when voting at the polls in person.97  The statute permitted a 
number of forms of identification, including a driver’s license, per-
sonal ID card, or license to carry a concealed handgun issued by the 
Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”), a United States military 
ID card, a United States citizenship certificate containing a photo or a 
passport.98  If the voter did not have one of these forms of identifica-
tion, the voter could have obtained an election identification certifi-
cate from the DPS.  Voters suffering from a disability were exempt 
from the requirement to have photo identification.99 
While this article is directed toward the proper means to ana-
lyze the discriminatory results prong of Section 2, it bears a passing 
mention that the court in Texas more than once departed from robust 
evidentiary standards in finding that SB 14 had a racially discrimina-
tory intent.100  For example, the court supported its intent analysis in 
Texas with evidence containing hyperbole (“every Republican mem-
ber of the legislature would have been lynched if the bill had not 
 
94 Complaint, United States v. Texas, No. 13-CV-00263, 2013 WL 4479214 (S.D. Tex. 
Aug. 22, 2013). 
95 Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at * 20 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 
2014); Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 
2014). 
96 S. B. 14, 2011 Leg., 82d Sess. (Tex. 2011). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id.  
100 Under Section 2, a finding of a racially discriminatory intent, standing alone, can im-
part liability. 
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passed”),101 speculations about states of mind (“Senator Ellis testified 
that all of the legislators knew that SB 14, through its intentional 
choices of which IDs to allow, was going to affect minorities the 
most”),102 and conclusory assertions (law based on “unfounded con-
cern about non-citizen students.”).103 
Here is another example of the court’s forgiving approach to-
ward the evidence pertaining to racial intent: 
There are no “smoking guns” in the form of an SB 14 
sponsor making an anti-African-American or anti-
Hispanic statement with respect to the incentive be-
hind the bill. . . .  Add to this environment that Repre-
sentative Smith admitted that it was “common 
sense”—he did not need a study to tell him—that mi-
norities were going to be adversely affected by SB 14.  
Yet SB 14 was pushed through in the name of goals 
that were not being served by its provisions.104 
In other words, no direct evidence of a racially discriminatory intent 
existed, but one legislator, disdaining any data or formal study, testi-
fied that “common sense” told him the law had a racially disparate 
impact, and since the law, to him, was not a close fit with the pur-
ported goal, the law must have a racially discriminatory intent.  This 
was the sort of evidence credited by the court in Veasey to establish a 
racially discriminatory intent against the State of Texas. 
In analyzing the results prong of Section 2, the court in Ve-
asey relied very heavily on the statistical disparity in how the law af-
fected minorities compared to non-minorities.105  The court did not 
address the fact that there was no barrier on the basis of race in the 
law to obtain photo identification.  Instead, it looked at the static and 
inadequate data set purporting to show which Texans already had 
photo identification.106  If the statistical difference between whites 
and non-whites possessing photo identification was greater than zero, 
the court in Veasey inferred a violation of Section 2.107 
The demographic data in the case, however, was anything but 
 
101 Veasey, 2014 WL 5090258, at *20. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at *18 (emphasis added). 
104 Id. at *55. 
105 Id. 
106 Veasey, 2014 WL 5090258, at *25. 
107 Id. at *23. 
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clear.  Nobody disputes that the exact number of people lacking iden-
tification, and further subdivided on the basis of race, cannot be cal-
culated with absolute precision.  Plaintiffs, therefore, produced a va-
riety of experts each testifying about a separate data set, but none of 
them claiming to capture the difference between white and non-white 
precision with absolute clarity.108  For example, the plaintiffs utilized 
an analysis commonly used by plaintiffs in voting cases that is 
fraught with error—the Spanish surname analysis.109  In Spanish sur-
name analysis, assumptions are made about a particular voter based 
on the last name of the voter.  Possession of a common Spanish sur-
name, such as Hernandez or Ortiz, led the plaintiff’s experts to make 
racial assumptions about that particular voter.110  The expert’s at-
tempted to scrub errors out of this perilous method by cross referenc-
ing the analysis with a variety of other data sets, including zip code 
sets fueled by Census responses on race, but the errors could not be 
eliminated.111  For example, a Russian woman hypothetically named 
Rosalina (Розалина) Kidalov, upon marrying a man with the last 
name Hernandez likely would be counted as being Hispanic for racial 
purposes. 
Crediting expert testimony using this method, the court in Ve-
asey supported a finding that SB 14 violated Section 2 as noted: 
Assigning his data the ethnicity information used in 
the SSVR, Dr. Ansolabehere found that 5.8% of all 
SSVR [Spanish Surname Voter Registration list] vot-
ers lacked qualified SB 14 ID compared to 4.1% of 
non-SSVR registered voters—a pool including An-
glos, African-Americans and all other races.  This 
1.7% difference is statistically significant.112 
The Veasey court also credited Catalist, LLC, a data crunching com-
pany exclusively used by left of center organizations and the Demo-
cratic Party.113  In Veasey, the United States offered evidence based 
on this political data.114  Again, the federal court sitting in Washing-
 
108 Id. at *21-25. 
109 Id. at *23. 
110 See id. 
111 See Veasey, 2014 WL 5090258, at *23. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at *23-24. 
114 Id. 
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ton D.C. in Texas v. Holder,115 had a very different view of the accu-
racy of Catalist’s politically-driven data than did the court in Texas. 
[W]e have serious doubts as to whether Catalist’s al-
gorithm accurately identified the racial composition of 
voters in this case.  Although Dr. Ansolabehere’s ex-
pert report states that Catalist is an industry leader in 
“identifying races based on names and Census data,” 
placed second in a “Multi-Cultural Name Matching 
Challenge,” and has been used in several academic 
studies, . . . the record contains no direct evidence as 
to the accuracy of Catalist’s algorithm.  To the contra-
ry, record evidence suggests—albeit not conclusive-
ly—that Catalist’s error rate in this case may be quite 
high.  When cross-examining Dr. Ansolabehere, Tex-
as’s counsel demonstrated anecdotally that a number 
of voters on his no-match list do, in fact, possess state-
issued photo ID, and further showed that the race 
listed on many of those voters’ IDs differed from Ca-
talist’s racial classification.116 
The court in Veasey adopted an analysis of the impact of SB 14 that 
matches the statistical inquiry in a Section 5 retrogression analysis, 
not the searching inquiry into real-world results of a particular elec-
toral system.  In a Section 5 review, the Justice Department may well 
conclude that an objection is warranted when “a disproportionate 
number of African-Americans and Hispanics populate that group of 
potentially disenfranchised voters.”117  But in a Section 2 claim, 
something more than a calculation as to how a racially neutral elec-
tion administration rule lands among differing racial groups is neces-
sary.  Slight statistical differences in who has possessed photo identi-
fication in the past should not conflate to a Section 2 violation.  
Instead, the Veasey court treated any difference or disparate impact as 
a bridge between SB 14 and the dark days of Jim Crow.118  “The fact 
that past discrimination has become present in SB 14 is apparent 
from both the obvious nature of the impact and the manner in which 
the legislature chose options that would make it harder for African-
 
115 888 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2012). 
116 Id. at 133-34. 
117 Veasey, 2014 WL 5090258, at *21. 
118 Id. at 20. 
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Americans and Hispanics to meet its requirements.”119 
This de minimis statistical standard to find a violation of Sec-
tion 2 is synonymous with the standard used to justify an objection 
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.  Remember, prior to Shelby 
County, an election law change could be blocked if it diminished the 
clout of a racial minority group.120  “Diminishing” means any reduc-
tion whatsoever in the political capacity of a racial minority group.121  
But this de minimis trigger in Section 5 has never been understood to 
apply to Section 2.  For starters, Section 2 does not rely on the con-
cept of reduction or diminishment.  Section 2 focuses on whether an 
equal opportunity to participate in the political process exists.122  In 
fact, the plain language of Section 2 mandates a broad totality of the 
circumstances inquiry into the practice or procedure.123  Section 2 in-
corporates concepts of causality.  A violation of Section 2 in chal-
lenges to at-large election systems, for example, occurs only after ra-
cial minority groups are effectively shut out of the political process.  
The broad totality of the circumstances inquiry provides defendants 
an opportunity to establish defenses such as mitigating measures to 
remedy discrimination from long ago, increases in minority participa-
tion and office holding, and other measures.124 
But the Veasey court’s misapplication of Section 2 does not 
begin and end with misplaced emphasis on disparate impacts.  The 
court gave inadequate regard for important language contained in 
Section 2.  First, Section 2 examines whether election systems are 
“not equally open to participation by” racial minorities.125  A bare sta-
tistical inquiry into the relative rates of photo identification posses-
sion by various racial sub-groups should not be an inquiry meriting 
priority over whether SB 14 is equally open to future participation by 
those same racial minorities.  Nothing prevents a black, white or His-
panic who does not have photo identification from obtaining it in 
Texas on equal terms.  Second, Section 2 examines whether racial 
minorities “have less opportunity than other members of the elec-
 
119 Id. 
120 Shelby, 133 S. Ct. at 2640-41. 
121 Id. at 2621. 
122 See 52 U.S.C. § 10301. 
123 See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). 
124 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 
F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993); Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5, 71 F.3d 1382 (8th Cir. 
1995); Teague v. Attala Cnty., Miss., 92 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 1996). 
125 Veasey, 2014 WL 5090258, at *49. 
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torate to participate in the political process . . . .”126  Again, the rele-
vant Section 2 inquiry is not aimed at the differing impacts of an 
election law change.  The plain terms of the statute gaze forward, and 
ask whether a practice or procedure results in unequal opportunities 
to vote.  “Opportunity” is the central concept that the plaintiffs and 
the court in Veasey did not adequately examine.  As we shall see be-
low, another federal district court facing a similar Section 2 challenge 
to election law changes made equality of opportunity the driving con-
cept behind its analysis of Section 2.127 
The final departure from traditional Section 2 analysis by the 
Veasey court is when it substituted poverty for race.  “Evidence 
shows that a discriminatory effect exists because: (1) SB 14 specifi-
cally burdens Texans living in poverty, who are less likely to possess 
qualified photo ID, are less able to get it, and may not otherwise need 
it . . . .”128  Throughout the Veasey opinion, the court treated poverty 
and race as synonymous.  While such an analysis may be more un-
derstandable to some social scientists or public commentators, the 
court is constrained by the language of the law, and the law has never 
recognized poverty to be a protected sub-set under Section 2.129  Nor 
did the court shy away from colorful adjectives in its legal analysis.  
“The draconian voting requirements imposed by SB 14 will dispro-
portionately impact low-income Texans because they are less likely 
to own or need one of the seven qualified IDs to navigate their 
lives.”130  Not only did the court in Veasey improperly apply a dispar-
ate impact test to Section 2, it used a protected class not found in Sec-
tion 2 jurisprudence.131 
Neither the Fifteenth Amendment nor the Voting Rights Act 
 
126 Id. 
127 See Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (2014). 
128 Veasey, 2014 WL 5090258, at *25. 
129 See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). 
130 Veasey, 2014 WL 5090258, at *25. 
131 It is true that Senate Factor Five makes relevant an inquiry into “effects of discrimina-
tion in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to partici-
pate effectively in the political process.”  See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37 (quoting S. REP. NO. 
97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 117, 206).  But even that language 
does not mention poverty, it measures discrimination.  Worse, Senate Factor Five opens an 
inquiry into only the effects of discrimination in education, employment and health.  It does 
not produce a protected class not found in the plain language of the statute thus permitting a 
disparate impact analysis of any election law change that studies the impact of the election 
change against this fictional protected class.  Section 2 certainly does not permit liability to 
attach after such an irrelevant statistical analysis. 
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makes poverty a protected class.  The court in Veasey did what Con-
gress has never done to Section 2, it allowed plaintiffs to establish a 
Section 2 violation by treating the poor as a protected class.132  In-
deed, such an expansive reading of the Voting Rights Act would cer-
tainly exceed the enforcement power of Congress under the Fifteenth 
Amendment. 
The final, and perhaps most glaring, error in the Section 2 
analysis in Veasey is the plain misapplication of Gingles.  This plain 
misapplication led the court to embark on the disparate impact analy-
sis even though Gingles aimed courts toward an analysis of the equal 
opportunity to participate and an analysis of real-world results of an 
electoral system.133  This error is compounded by the Veasey court 
treating the Texas statute like a vote denial claim, but using a statisti-
cal analysis more appropriate for vote dilution claims.134 
The Veasey court turned to Gingles: 
In vote denial cases, a two-part analysis is conducted 
under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.  First, a 
court determines whether the law has a disparate im-
pact on minorities.  Second, if a disparate impact is es-
tablished, the court assesses whether that impact is 
caused by or linked to social and historical conditions 
that currently or in the past produced discrimination 
against members of the protected class.135 
A closer examination of this critical passage reveals that the court 
cited Gingles for propositions it may have wished the Supreme Court 
would say about Section 2, but which the Supreme Court decidedly 
did not say. 
The court said Gingles blesses a “disparate impact” analy-
sis.136  The citation in Gingles relied on for this proposition makes no 
mention of disparate impact.  Instead, it says: 
The “right” question . . . is whether “as a result of the 
challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have 
an equal opportunity to participate in the political pro-
cesses and to elect candidates of their choice. . . .  In 
 
132 See Veasey, 2014 WL 5090258, at *26-27. 
133 See id. at *49. 
134 Id. at *50. 
135 Id. at *49. 
136 Id. at *50. 
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order to answer this question, a court must assess the 
impact of the contested structure or practice on mi-
nority electoral opportunities “on the basis of objec-
tive factors.”137 
What Gingles said here differs a great deal from the idea that a statis-
tical disparate impact analysis gives rise to Section 2 liability.  To the 
contrary, the Supreme Court speaks plainly about “equal opportuni-
ty” and empirical electoral results.138  The only mention of “impacts” 
in the citation does not relate to a disparate impact trigger for liability 
but rather whether the “impact” of the election law impacts real-
world “electoral opportunities.”139  Equal opportunity must be im-
pacted. 
Nowhere does Gingles bless a statistical exercise tripping 
Section 2 liability whenever an election process law, equally open to 
all and facially race neutral, has some theoretical (and de minimis) 
statistical difference in how the law impacts racial subgroups.  If con-
formity with the law is equally open to all, any discriminatory impact 
is highly detached from legitimate federal interests under Section 2.  
After all, will not every single election law change ultimately have 
some theoretical disparate impact on racial subgroups once the social 
scientists and statisticians are done crunching statistics?  It is impos-
sible to avoid some disparate impact on some racial subgroup every 
time the law is changed.  Absent a showing that the change was en-
acted with a discriminatory racial intent, denies equal opportunity to 
participate in the process, or has real world electoral impacts in the 
ability to elect candidates of choice, Section 2 should not be implicat-
ed. 
The second statement about Gingles used in Veasey to justify 
a disparate impact analysis for Section 2 liability also missed the 
mark.  Remember, the Veasey court stated that “if a disparate impact 
is established, the court assesses whether that impact is caused by or 
linked to social and historical conditions that currently or in the past 
produced discrimination against members of the protected class.”140  
Once again, Gingles said no such thing.  The citation from which 
Gingles relied on here said “[p]laintiffs must demonstrate that, under 
 
137 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44. 
138 Id. at 44-46. 
139 See id. at 44. 
140 Veasey, 2014 WL 5090258, at *49. 
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the totality of the circumstances, the [practices] result in unequal ac-
cess to the electoral process.”141  This passage, as before, focused on 
unequal access, not disparate impact.142 
Here, Gingles is referencing equal opportunity to participate 
and to elect candidates of their choice as well as “the impact of the 
contested structure or practice on minority electoral opportunities.”143  
The third Gingles precondition relates to causality in electoral de-
feats, not statistical disparate impacts.144  This precondition asks if, 
more often than not, minority-preferred candidates lose elections be-
cause of racially polarized voting.145  In other words, it is an uncom-
promising barometer gauging why minority preferred candidates lose.  
The court in Veasey did not even come close to using this robust 
standard of causality of electoral outcomes and indeed paid no atten-
tion whatsoever to the question of electoral defeats compared to elec-
toral wins.  In doing so, the Veasey court dispensed entirely with the 
inconvenient question of causality and whether the challenged voter 
photo identification law made any real difference to minorities that 
impaired their ability to elect candidates of choice or participate 
equally.  “Impacts” to the Gingles Court meant objective tangible 
electoral outcomes.146  “Impacts” to the Veasey court meant a contest 
of statisticians using datasets to conclude that an electoral change has 
 
141 Gingles, 478 U.S at 46 (citing S. REP. 97-417, at  16 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 193). 
142 It is true that the Veasey court also cited Gonzalez v. Arizona, 624 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 
2010), to fold in the term discriminatory “impact” into supporting the court’s framework.  It 
remains to be seen whether the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals will import this language.  
More importantly, however, Gonzalez used the discriminatory impact analysis in vote dilu-
tion context (as opposed to the vote denial analysis the Veasey court purports to conduct) to 
emphasize the causality requirement in Gingles Three.  The Veasey court could have quoted 
the Ninth Circuit a few paragraphs later in the opinion, but did not, when it said: 
[T]he causation requirement is crucial: a court may not enjoin a voting 
practice under § 2 unless there is evidence that the practice results in a 
denial or abridgement of the rights of a citizen on account of race or col-
or. . . .  But Gonzalez adduced no evidence that Latinos’ ability or inabil-
ity to obtain or possess identification for voting purposes (whether or not 
interacting with the history of discrimination and racially polarized vot-
ing) resulted in Latinos having less opportunity to participate in the po-
litical process and to elect representatives of their choice. 
Gonazalez, 624 F.3d at 1194.  Even the Ninth Circuit demands a real-world electoral out-
come causality nexus. 
143 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44. 
144 Id. at 51. 
145 Id. at 52. 
146 See Gingles, 478 U.S at 57-61. 
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a statistically negative impact on minorities greater than zero.147  In 
adopting this numbers-driven analysis for Section 2, the Veasey 
court, in fact, replaced traditional Section 2 analysis with the statisti-
cal tripwires contained in Section 5.148 
The Veasey court purported to engage in a broader inquiry 
beyond simply looking at a statistical difference of a few percentage 
points between minority and non-minority possession of photo identi-
fication.  But the core of the reasoning behind the ruling in Veasey 
was this slight statistical difference, or diminishment, between the 
sets of voters.  All of the other analysis bootstrapped back to this sta-
tistical disparity to find a Section 2 violation.  The statistical disparity 
drove the analysis in Veasey, and thus, Section 2 was transformed by 
the court into something it is not. 
2. Wisconsin 
In Wisconsin, voter photo identification laws faced a similar 
attack utilizing Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.149  In Frank v. 
Walker,150 the court held that Wisconsin’s voter photo identification 
law violated Section 2.151  The court in Frank explicitly departed 
from the Gingles framework and “largely disregarded” the Senate 
Factors, claiming that courts may do so in Section 2 cases not involv-
ing redistricting.152  This leap is not entirely accurate.  For example, 
 
147 See Veasey, 2014 WL 5090258 at *20-25. 
148 Inexplicably, Texas actually challenged the constitutionality of the plaintiffs’ purported 
use of totality of the circumstances elements under Section 2 as being vague.  Id. at *49.  
The use of additional Section 2 elements beyond a basic statistical analysis both benefited 
Texas and was part of a longstanding and well-understood component of Section 2 litigation 
commencing decades earlier in Gingles.  The court rightfully rejected arguments that a totali-
ty of the circumstances inquiry as part of plaintiffs’ case was unconstitutional.  Id.  A de-
fendant in a Section 2 case is free to use the Senate Factors as elements upon which to pro-
vide rebuttal evidence.  For example, for Senate Factor One, a defendant may demonstrate 
an absence of modern official discrimination or mitigating efforts to remedy past discrimina-
tion.  The Senate Factors may be both a weapon for a plaintiff and a shield for a defendant.  
It does not appear that Texas utilized the Senate Factors as a vehicle to introduce rebuttal 
evidence, something defendants in Section 2 cases are free to do.  Most importantly, a de-
fendant may argue that a plaintiff failed to establish enough Senate Factors, therefore, did 
not prove the case.  Simply, Senate Factors are elements a defendant should welcome, not 
oppose.  No court hearing a Section 2 claim, to my research, has ever considered the Senate 
Factors to be “vague,” certainly not by 2013. 
149 Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 842. 
150 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (2014). 
151 Id. at 879. 
152 Id. at 869. 
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in United States v. Brown,153 another Section 2 case which did not in-
volve redistricting, the court engaged in an exhaustive examination of 
the Senate Factors.154 
The Frank court, after abandoning any analysis under Gingles 
or using the Senate Factors, adopted an explicit disparate impact test 
for Section 2: 
I conclude that Section 2 protects against a voting 
practice that creates a barrier to voting that is more 
likely to appear in the path of a voter if that voter is a 
member of a minority group than if he or she is not.  
The presence of a barrier that has this kind of dispro-
portionate impact prevents the political process from 
being “equally open” to all and results in members of 
the minority group having “less opportunity” to partic-
ipate in the political process and to elect representa-
tives of their choice.155 
It again bears mention that every single change in election law, no 
matter how small, will have a disproportionate impact on some racial 
group.  Some changes will impact whites to a greater degree than 
blacks, and other changes will do the opposite.  The disproportionate 
impact may be beyond our statistical and social science tools to quan-
tify, but it will almost always be there.  If Election Day were to be 
changed in Wisconsin, one race would benefit and one would suffer.  
If the entire election were conducted by mail instead, one race would 
benefit and one race would suffer.  Even if a polling place were 
moved inside a precinct, the relocation would disproportionately im-
pact one race and benefit another, as it is impossible to have perfect 
racial neutrality in any election law change.  The version of Section 2 
in Frank and Veasey created a one-way ratchet where federal voting 
law may be used to block any election change that hurts racial minor-
ities.  In other words, these cases concoct a version of Section 2 that 
mirrors the retrogression standard in Section 5 and mobilizes Section 
2 to undertake what Shelby County ended, except nationwide.156 
 
153 494 F. Supp. 2d 440 (S.D. Miss. 2007). 
154 Id. at 482-85. 
155 Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 870. 
156 Like Texas, Wisconsin apparently took a position which made the court’s task simpler.  
“As the defendants concede, the plaintiffs’ evidence ‘shows that minorities are less likely 
than whites to currently possess qualifying ID.’ ”  Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 870 (quoting 
Defs.’ Post–Trial Brief at 1).  Because the defendants concede that minorities are less likely 
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The court has discarded the question of whether racial minori-
ties have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process. 
There is nothing in these cases indicating that a Sec-
tion 2 plaintiff must show that the challenged voting 
practice makes it impossible for minorities to vote or 
that minorities are incapable of complying with the 
challenged voting procedure.  Therefore, I reject the 
defendants’ argument that Act 23 could violate Sec-
tion 2 only if minorities who currently lack IDs are in-
capable of obtaining them.157 
The court also rejected the argument that even if the burden to obtain 
photo identification was minimal, and applied to everyone equally 
regardless of race, Section 2 will be violated because of subsequent 
behavioral choices by minorities.158  “Even if the burden of obtaining 
a qualifying ID proves to be minimal for the vast majority of Blacks 
and Latinos who will need to obtain one in order to vote, that burden 
will still deter a large number of such Blacks and Latinos from vot-
ing.”159 
The court stated that the analysis extended beyond merely ex-
amining statistically disparate impacts.160  But to help it get beyond a 
sparse statistical analysis, the Frank court substitutes poverty for race 
as the Veasey court did: 
[T]he disproportionate impact of the photo ID re-
quirement results from the interaction of the require-
ment with the effects of past or present discrimination.  
Blacks and Latinos in Wisconsin are disproportionate-
ly likely to live in poverty.  Individuals who live in 
poverty are less likely to drive or participate in other 
 
than whites to currently possess a photo ID, it is not necessary for me to discuss the evidence 
adduced at trial in support of this point and make explicit findings of fact. 
157 Id. at 874-75. 
158 Id. at 875. 
159 Id.  This conclusion was not supported by any empirical data.  It was supported by the 
testimony of academics, including Marc Levine, a Professor of History, Urban Studies and 
Economic Development at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and Barry Burden, Pro-
fessor at the University of Wisconsin.  See also J. Christian Adams, Justice Department Ex-
pert Witness: Blacks ‘Less Sophisticated Voters,’ BREITBART.COM (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2014/10/20/justice-department-expert-witness-
blacks-less-sophisticated/. 
160 See Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 876-80. 
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activities for which a photo ID may be required . . . .161 
In sum, the Frank court found that Section 2 was violated because 
voter photo identification has a statistically disparate impact on racial 
minorities because it burdens them with costs disproportionately, and 
the burden is significant because racial minorities will have more dif-
ficulty obtaining identification than will whites, so it goes, because 
they are disproportionately poor, and that poverty, according to the 
court, is caused by discrimination which happened in the past.162  
This is the logical structure upon which the new deployment of Sec-
tion 2 is based. 
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S REJECTION OF FRANK’S SECTION 
2 ANALYSIS 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment, noting 
numerous errors with the lower court’s findings and conclusions.163  
Concerning the lower court’s first inquiry, the Seventh Circuit ex-
plained that “Section 2(b) tells us that Section 2(a) “does not con-
demn a voting practice just because it has a disparate effect on minor-
ities.”164  Rather, Section 2(b) says Section 2(a) requires that the 
evidence demonstrate a denial of the right to vote on account of 
race.165  According to the court, “unless Wisconsin makes it needless-
ly hard to get photo ID, it has not denied anything to any voter” as far 
as Section 2 is concerned.166  Moreover, none of the lower court’s 
findings demonstrated that under Wisconsin law “blacks or Latinos 
have less ‘opportunity’ than whites to get photo IDs.”167  Rather, the 
lower court only found that “because they have lower income, these 
groups are less likely to use that opportunity.”168  According to the 
Seventh Circuit, “that does not violate § 2.”169 
To the extent disparate impact may bear on “opportunity,” it 
cannot be assessed in isolation, but must be considered along with the 
 
161 Id. at 877. 
162 Id. at 879. 
163 Frank, 768 F.3d at 745. 




168 Frank, 768 F.3d at 753. 
169 Id. 
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“entire voting and registration system.”170  On the evidence before the 
court, “blacks [did] not seem to be disadvantaged by Wisconsin’s 
electoral system as a whole.”171  An analysis that did not require the 
“totality of circumstances” as Section 2 did risked dismantling every 
piece of the state’s voting system on the showing of a mere disparity 
among the races.172 
The Seventh Circuit also took issue with the second prong of 
the lower court’s analysis; whether the disparate impact is caused by 
or linked to the state’s history of racial discrimination—because it 
“does not distinguish discrimination by the defendants from other 
persons’ discrimination.”173  The distinction between discrimination 
by the state and discrimination in the private sector is “important, be-
cause units of government are responsible for their own discrimina-
tion but not for rectifying the effects of other persons’ discrimina-
tion.”174  Notably, the lower court’s findings did not establish that the 
state of Wisconsin has discriminated against Blacks and Latinos in 
the areas the lower court deemed relevant under Section 2.175  Absent 
such findings, the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits, 
even under the lower court’s erroneous Section 2 analysis. 
V. NORTH CAROLINA 
In 2013, SL 2013-381176 became law in North Carolina.177  
This revision to North Carolina’s election procedures included a re-
quirement that voters present some form of photo identification at the 
polls, eliminated the ability to register to vote and to vote simultane-
ously (same-day registration), reduced the number of days one could 




172 Id. at 754 (“At oral argument, counsel for one of the two groups of plaintiffs made ex-
plicit what the district judge’s approach implies: that if whites are 2% more likely to register 
than are blacks, then the registration system top to bottom violates § 2; and if white turnout 
on election day is 2% higher, then the requirement of in-person voting violates § 2.”). 
173 Frank, 768 F.3d at 755. 
174 Id. at 753. 
175 Id. 
176 H.B. 589, 2013 Leg., 381st Sess. (N.C. 2013). 
177 North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 338 
(M.D.N.C. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.  League of Women Voters of North 
Carolina v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014), stayed in North Carolina v. League 
of Women Voters of North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014). 
32
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 2, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss2/8
2015 THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 329 
in the precinct where they actually lived.178  Plaintiffs, including the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), League of Women Voters and the United States, thereaf-
ter filed an action challenging the new laws as a violation, inter alia, 
of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.179 
Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the 
changes involving same-day registration, changes to early voting, and 
the requirement that a voter vote in their own precinct, from being 
implemented for the 2014 general election.180  In denying the motion 
for a preliminary injunction, the court in Frank provided an analysis 
of Section 2 liability more consistent with the language of Section 2 
and the jurisprudence requiring demonstrable electoral impacts.  The 
McCrory court also detected the litigation havoc that the logic in Ve-
asey and Frank could spawn in other states, which did not have 
same-day voter registration, weeks of voting before election day, or 
did not let voters cast ballots in precincts where they do not live.181 
Significantly, the McCrory court rejected any Section 2 anal-
ysis that behaves like Section 5 retrogression analysis.  The proper 
inquiry, the court noted, is not to compare the new law with the old 
law and allow statisticians and academics opine about what they be-
lieve the disparate impacts of the new law may be on racial sub-
groups.  “In doing so, the [Brown v. Detzner] court emphasized that it 
was not comparing the old law to the new one, because that retro-
gression standard applies only in a Section 5 proceeding.”182  Further, 
“[t]he court underscored the important role the distinction between 
the Section 2 standard and the Section 5 retrogression standard and 
their different burdens of proof played in the [Section 2] case.”183  
 
178 Id. at 336-38.  As in Texas, these changes were made for the legislative purpose of in-
creasing election integrity.  For example, the uncontroverted record showed that because of 
same-day registration, 1,288 voters in 2012 had their ballots counted using same-day regis-
tration without being properly verified as eligible voters.  Id. at 353 n.37.  The problem of 
ballots being counted without verification of eligibility due to same-day registration was so 
acute in the town of Pembroke, North Carolina, the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
was forced to order a new election because the outcome was tainted due to same-day regis-
tration.  Inexplicably, as in Texas, Wisconsin also agreed to dispense with an examination of 
the Senate Factors and thus abandoned a variety of defenses available to the defendants 
based on those factors. 
179 Id. at 337. 
180 Id. at 336. 
181 McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 351-52. 
182 Id. at 348 (citing 895 F. Supp. 2d 123 (M.D. Fla. 2012)). 
183 Id. at 348 n.24. 
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Furthermore: 
[B]ecause Section 2 does not incorporate a “retrogres-
sion” standard, the logical conclusion of Plaintiffs’ ar-
gument would have rendered North Carolina in viola-
tion of the VRA before adoption of SDR simply for 
not having adopted it.  Yet, neither the United States 
nor the private Plaintiffs have ever taken the position 
that a jurisdiction was in violation of Section 2 simply 
for failing to offer SDR.  Indeed, “[e]xtending Section 
2 that far could have dramatic and far-reaching ef-
fects” . . . .184 
McCrory walled off any effort to import concepts germane to 
Section 5 into a Section 2 analysis.  In doing so, the court in McCrory 
provided a differing analysis for a Section 2 claim more in keeping 
with the statute’s purpose and plain language: “whether the current 
electoral law interacts with historical discrimination and social condi-
tions to cause black voters to have unequal access to the polls.”185  
The court rejected the transformation of Section 2 into a statute re-
sembling Section 5: 
 
[H]ere, the court is not concerned with whether the 
elimination of SDR will “worsen the position of mi-
nority voters in comparison to the preexisting voting 
standard, practice, or procedure,” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)—a Section 5 inquiry, but whether 
North Carolina’s existing voting scheme (without 
SDR) interacts with past discrimination and present 
conditions to cause a discriminatory result.186 
  Finally, the court noted the important constitutional concerns 
implicated by these competing models of Section 2 interpretation. 
The Constitution’s Elections Clause reserves to the 
 
184 Id. at 351.  The court also noted that the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 ex-
plicitly sanctioned a state cutting off all voter registration up to 30 days before an election.  
See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(1) (2014) (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(1)).  Con-
gress could not have envisioned that Section 2 authorized a cause of action against states 
which do not have (or which had) same-day registration when federal law explicitly envi-
sions a cut off of registration long before election day. 
185 McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 348. 
186 Id. at 352 (internal citations omitted). 
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States the general power to regulate “[t]he Times, 
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators 
and Representatives,” subject to laws passed by Con-
gress.  “Common sense, as well as constitutional law, 
compels the conclusion that government must play an 
active role in structuring elections; ‘as a practical mat-
ter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections 
if they are to be a substantial regulation of elections if 
they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, 
rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic 
processes.’ ”187 
Whether to impose Section 2 obligations on a state using the lower 
thresholds in Veasey and Frank, or using the model in McCrory af-
fects the Elections Clause of the Constitution.188  States were given 
the power to run their own elections.189  Naturally they must do so in 
conformity with the various amendments to the Constitution affecting 
elections.  The presumption that states may manage their own elec-
tions is not some accidental choice.  It was a choice informed by the 
lessons of history that centralized control is eventually adverse to in-
dividual freedom and liberty.  The Founders knew that a central au-
thority with control over state elections would invariably erode liber-
ty.  As the Supreme Court put it in Shelby, “the federal balance ‘is not 
just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties 
that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’ ”190 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court may have to decide which version of Sec-
tion 2 is the correct version.  Does the McCrory court and the Sev-
enth Circuit in Frank provide the best analytical model for analyzing 
election process issues under Section 2 when these opinions elevated 
equality of opportunity as the most significant inquiry?  Or does the 
statistical inquiry into disparate impacts conducted by the district 
courts in Veasey and Frank and endorsed by the Fourth Circuit in 
McCrory accurately reflect the language contained in Section 2 and 
 
187 Id. at 343 (internal citations omitted). 
188 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
189 Id. 
190 Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 
2364 (2011)). 
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the purposes behind the Voting Rights Act?  The balance of power 
between the states and federal government will be affected by the an-
swer, especially considering that there appears to be no way to recon-
cile the two models. 
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